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Abstract
Minute pixel changes in an image drastically change the prediction that the
deep learning model makes. One of the most significant problems that could
arise due to this, for instance, is autonomous driving. Many methods have been
proposed to combat this with varying amounts of success. We propose a 3 step
method for defending such attacks. First, we denoise the image using statistical
methods. Second, we show that adopting multiple color spaces in the same
model can help us to fight these adversarial attacks further as each color space
detects certain features explicit to itself. Finally, the feature maps generated
are enlarged and sent back as an input to obtain even smaller features. We show
that the proposed model does not need to be trained to defend an particular type
of attack and is inherently more robust to black-box, white-box, and grey-box
adversarial attack techniques. In particular, the model is 56.12 percent more
robust than compared models in case of white box attacks when the models are
not subject to adversarial example training.
Keywords: Adversarial, color spaces, robustness
?Supported by NSFC project Grant No. U1833101, Shenzhen Science and Technologies
project under Grant No. JCYJ20160428182137473 and the Joint Research Center of Tencent
and Tsinghua.
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: s1960707@ed.ac.uk (Shreyank N Gowda ),
yuanc@sz.tsinghua.edu.cn (Chun Yuan)
Preprint submitted to Cognitive Systems Research March 12, 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
05
00
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
0 M
ar 
20
20
1. Introduction
Deep learning models have achieved extraordinary results in computer vi-
sion and natural language processing tasks due to the extensive amount of com-
puting power available. They have shown near human capabilities in speech
recognition[1], natural language processing[2], scene understanding tasks[3] and
video recognition [4]. Although these algorithms show great promise, neural
networks are black-box systems because there is restricted theoretical compre-
hension for their behavior. This lack of understanding has the potential to be
dangerous.
Recent research has shown them to be low on security. Small perturbations
to existing data have shown to yield negative classification results with high
confidence. Recent research[5][6][7] has shown how these adversarial examples
can be generated off existing data. These deftly crafted adversarial examples
can also force the neural network to classify the given image into any chosen
target class. These vulnerabilities of neural networks escalate critical questions
regarding the robustness, dependability, and security of deep learning applica-
tions. Figure 1 shows one such example.
Figure 1: An example of how noise added can change classification result of a model [5] (in
this case from a panda to a gibbon)
In [8] and [9] it was seen that speech or image input can be modified to
resemble relevant input to the neural network but look/sound like complete
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gibberish to humans. In [10], real-time input captured through a cell phone
camera can be subject to adversarial perturbations that result in complete mis-
classification. Authors in [11] proposed the use of manifold distance, while,
[12] utilized principal components to recognize adversarial attacks. These can
easily be skipped through by prior knowledge about the nature of the system.
Optimization-based methods that are utilized to develop provably-secure mod-
els are presently restricted to relatively smaller networks and the guarantees
provided are insufficient for real-life applications [13][14].
Our paper provides a novel idea to make a model more robust without having
the need to train the model separately for attacks. Following are the steps,
• First, we perform statistical denoising of image. Second, we use an en-
semble model consisting of small but wide Densenet [15] models.
• Each model will be having an input mutated into a different color space.
• Third, the feature maps generated are enlarged in size and sent again to
the start of each densenet, to retrain the model to obtain even smaller and
precise features.
The details of the model and the reasons behind our choices will be explained
in further sections.
2. Related Work
We provide a compendium of adversarial attacks and techniques to defend
against them in the following subsections. The input image can be considered
as a 3-D tensor I where the three dimensions are height, width, and colors.
Height and width represent the dimensions of the image and color represents
the number of colors the image displays.
Adversarial examples can be broadly classified to two types: targeted and
untargeted. Targeted examples implies that the generated example compels the
network to output any given image into a particular class and an untargeted ex-
ample simply makes the network mis-classify an image. Every example involves
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adding a distortion δ to the image. L p norms are often used as measures for
these distortions.
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial samples were originally described in [7]. This subsection will
briefly look into some of these attacks and what these attacks do. Fast gradient
sign method (FGSM) was described in [5]. It is an L ∞ type of attack and
uses the gradient obtained from the loss function to determine the direction of
modification for the pixels. It is represented in (1).  represents the magnitude
of distortion added and y is the true label.
I′ = I− .sign(5IJ(I, ytrue)) (1)
The randomized fast gradient sign method (RAND-FGSM) was proposed in
[16]. The mathematical explanation is shown in (2) and (3).
I′ = I+ rand(α) (2)
I′′ = I′ + (− α).sign(5I′J(I′, ytrue)) (3)
The Carlini-Wagner attack proposed in [17] is an extremely powerful opti-
mized based adversarial attack. It is a series of L o , L 2 and L ∞ attacks with
comparatively lower distortions with the above mentioned attacks. The value
of constant c > 0 and steps to obtain it can be found in [17].
Another attack method using FGSM as base was shown in [6]. It is called
basic iterative method. It applies FGSM multiple times with a smaller step size.
Equation (4),(5) describes it.
I′0 = I (4)
I′n+1 = I
′
n + α.sign(5IJ(I′n+1, ytrue)) (5)
Another form of attack is called the Jacobian saliency attack[18]. It is a
computationally expensive algorithm. It is an L o form of attack. It basically
chooses the most influential pixels by utilizing a greedy algorithm that calculates
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the Jacobian saliency map. Fault injection attack was proposed in [19]. The idea
was to make slight changes to the DNN parameters to cause misclassification.
An attack called Deepfool (DF) was proposed in [20]. It determines an
approximation of the decision boundary to perceive possible locations for ad-
versarial perturbations. Attacks performed knowing the classifier details such
as model parameters, weights etc are called white box attacks. Some attacks
treat the classifier as a black box and hence these attacks are called black-box
attacks.
2.2. Defense strategies
One of the earliest proposed techniques was to train the neural network
to adversarially generated samples [16]. Training with adversarial data made
the neural network more robust to adversarial attacks. Label-smoothing [21]
was shown to perform well against certain types of adversarial attacks. In the
context of purifying the samples, generative models have been utilized [22] to
varying degrees of success.
Use of auxiliary networks to clean samples also showed marked improvement
in results against adversarial attacks[22][23]. In [24] defensive distillation was
proposed, it trains the classifier using a variant of distillation [25]. While it
gave improved results for white-box attacks, it failed to protect the network
from black-box attacks [17].
MagNet [23] trains a collection of autoencoder networks (called as reformer
networks) to make adversarial examples seem more natural. At test time, one
autoencoder is randomly chosen and this magnifies the strength of their strat-
egy. More recently, Defense-GAN was proposed [26], it uses the generator part
of the GAN to sanitize the input before passing it to the classifier. APE-GAN
[27] amended the generator part to clean the adversarial samples and the dis-
criminator differentiates between real and adversarial inputs.
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3. Proposed Method
3.1. Denoising and Color spaces
Denoising can be considered as a minimizing problem where we minimize a
loss and a penalty. We propose the use of the L1-norm of pixel updates as the
penalty. The advantage of using L1-norms is that we deal directly with only
the noisy pixels. We are given a noisy wavelet coefficient of a noisy image yi,
we want to recover the noise-free wavelet coefficient xi via a MAP estimator
xˆi. xˆi. We assume that the noise in the image can be represented in the form
of Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard deviation σn. Then we can
express p(yi|xi) using Baye’s rule as seen in (6). The advantage of using this
non-parametric approach is that the model automatically adapts to the observed
image data.
p(yi|xi) = 1
σn
√
2pi
e−(yi−xi)
2/2σ2n (6)
A color space is basically an organization of colors. We can also look at
color spaces as an abstract mathematical model that aids us to portray colors
as numbers. For more details about the theory between different color spaces,
one can refer to [28]. ColorNet [29] shows us that using an ensemble model
of different color spaces help us to obtain state of the art classification results.
Also, based on the confustion matrix in [29] we can say that the activation map
for each image is slightly different after preprocessing the image into a different
color space.
3.2. Architecture of model and novelties proposed
We first denoise the images as explained earlier. Next, we pass the image
after denoising to our network. Our network comprises of 4 small but wide
DenseNets[30]. We use a wide-approach for the Densenet [15] as it reduces
the parameters. The denoised image is sent as input to the first densenet, while
further preprocessing is done in the form of color space conversion to LAB, HSV
and YUV. We reduce the number of color spaces based on individual accuracy
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[29][31] to aid the time of execution needed for our approach. The final activation
map is taken and passed as a recurrent input after resizing the image based on
the activation map size. This process is shown in Figure 2. This progressive
resizing helps to detect tinier features, increasing the robustness of the network.
The entire architecture is shown in Figure 3.The entire architecture is shown
in Figure 3. We take the feature map at the last layer, collect the part of the
image with the highest density and enlarge the image to the original size of the
image (for instance 32x32 in the CIFAR datasets [32]). Hence, each image is
used as an input twice to the model.
Figure 2: Progressive resizing of activation map flowchart
First, we denoise the image using a statistical approach. Second, to the
best of our knowledge, color spaces have not been explored with regards to
adversarial attacks. Third, progressive resizing, is a novel technique that uses
the feature map of an image to augment the dataset by enlarging the map and
using the same as an input to the model.
4. Experimental Analysis
We test our model on the 3 types of attacks discussed earlier namely: white-
box, grey-box and black-box attacks.
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Figure 3: Architecture of proposed model
4.1. Training
As discussed in the earlier section, our proposed model denoises the original
input image. This modified image is sent as input to one small densenet model.
The image is simultaneously processed into LAB, YUV and HSV images and
sent as inputs to corresponding densenets. The activation map at the final layer
is sent back as an input to the densenet by cropping out the original input with
the densest parts of the activation map, and this cropped image is resized to
the original image and again sent as input. This progressive resizing technique
is done to obtain lower level features that help to detect an object with higher
accuracy.
4.2. White-box attacks
We compare our results with Resnet-50 [33], VGG-19 [34], Pixel-Deflection
(PD) [35], MagNet [23]. The algorithms used for the attacks are FGSM, IGSM,
DFool, JSMA, C and W. Table 1 contains the comparison results. The results
obtained are from choosing a random subset of the imagenet dataset and taking
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Table 1: Classification results without training to defend
Attack L2 Resnet VGG-19 P-D Proposed
FGSM 0.05 20.3 12.4 20.1 78.3
DFool 0.03 25.8 23.7 26.3 72.8
IGSM 0.04 14.3 9.7 14.1 79.6
C and W 0.02 4.1 0.00 4.7 71.6
JSMA 0.03 25.5 29 25.5 72.9
Table 2: Classification results after training to defend
Attack L2 Resnet VGG-19 P-D Proposed
FGSM 0.05 79.2 79.0 79.9 81.4
DFool 0.03 86.3 84.2 86.2 84.3
IGSM 0.04 83.9 78.9 83.9 83.7
C and W 0.02 92.9 93.1 92.9 90.9
JSMA 0.03 91.3 93.3 91.6 90.8
the average prediction over 6 runs. Since, the training involves addition of
a different adversarial noise we get different results. Averaging them gives a
higher level of accuracy. For reference purposes, table 2 highlights the results
of how the various models perform when trained to deal with particular types
of adversarial examples. As can be seen from table 1 our proposed model is
significantly more robust to adversarial attacks and performs reasonably well
without training the model for defense against attacks. In terms of numbers, the
proposed method is 56.12 percent more robust without training. Although,
after training it performs slightly worse than the other mentioned models. Even
then, the model only performs 1.08 percent worse on average.
4.3. Black-box and grey-box attacks
Generating black box attacks are more difficult than white-box attacks and
hence we use models that already have black-box attacks performed on them
and compare the results with our model. Again, we use the vast imagenet
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Table 3: Comparison of top-1 accuracy on imagenet against blackbox attacks
Network No-attack DFool FGSM
D3 (n = 40K, k = 5) 71.8 63.1 68.3
D3 (n = 10K, k = 5) 70.8 64.6 68.5
Quilting [42] 70.1 65.2 65.5
TVM + QUILTING [42] 72.4 65.8 65.7
Proposed Method 78.3 76.9 77.4
Table 4: Comparison of top-1 accuracy on imagenet against grey-box attacks
Network No-attack DFool FGSM
D3 (n = 40K, k = 5) 71.8 57.8 67.3
D3 (n = 10K, k = 5) 70.8 62.3 67.5
Quilting [42] 69.7 34.5 39.8
TVM + QUILTING [42] 66.3 44.7 31.4
Proposed Method 79.6 78.2 81.3
dataset [36]. We compare the top-1 accuracy of our model against the models
proposed in [37] (divide, denoise and dispatch or D3) and [38]. Table 3 shows
the results obtained. Attacks used were deep fool and FGSM. In this case, it can
be seen that the proposed model performs significantly better than the models
in comparison and that the black-box attacks have insignificant impact on the
model.
Grey-box attacks are attacks wherein the adversary has access to the network
weights, but does not have an idea about the defense mechanism in place. We
do the same comparisons as with the black-box attacks. Table 4 shows the
results obtained. Again, as seen with black-box attacks, the model shows high
robustness to adversarial attacks.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm that shows robustness to adver-
sarial attacks. It follows a 3 step process. First, the image is preprocessed by
denoising all the images. This helps the model to not overfit on specific features.
Next, we use a color-space ensemble model. This was on the basis that certain
classes of images were being represented better by certain color spaces. Finally,
we use progressive image resizing by cropping out the part of the image that
has highest density of features and then resizing into the original input size and
passing it back to the network as an input. This helps us detect even smaller
features and hence can detect an object correctly under adversarial conditions.
Based on the results we could see that the proposed model was 56.12 percent
more robust without training.
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